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Abstract
We consider the impact of adoption of a low priority initiative in some jurisdictions within
Los Angeles County on police behavior. Low priority initiatives instruct police to make
the enforcement of low level marijuana possession offenses their “lowest priority.” Using
detailed data from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and a difference-indifferences strategy, we show that the mandate resulted in a lower arrest rate for
misdemeanor marijuana possession in adopting areas. However, the lower relative arrest
rate is driven by a spike in the arrest rate in areas not affected by the mandate rather than a
reduction in adopting areas.

1

I.

Introduction

Since the 1990s, there have been ongoing drug crime reforms by state and local
jurisdictions throughout the U.S. Several of these changes have focused on marijuana
laws, typically driven by changing public perceptions regarding marijuana. In 1996,
California became the first state to allow medical cannabis, with 22 more states and
Washington, DC legalizing as of 2015. 1 In 2014, Congress “quietly” ended the federal
ban on medical cannabis. 2 Even more dramatically, in 2012 Colorado and Washington
voted to legalize recreational cannabis use and Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, DC
followed suit in 2014. 3 While public perceptions may be changing towards marijuana,
and legislative changes and voter initiatives may be telling the criminal justice system to
ignore these offenses, this does not necessarily mean that police officers, prosecutors, and
judges are following the wishes of lawmakers and the public (Tonry, 1996).
In this paper, we look at the impact of the adoption of a low priority initiative on
police behavior in Los Angeles County. Low priority initiatives were local mandates that
stated police should make the enforcement of minor marijuana offenses the “lowest
enforcement priority.” Within Los Angeles County, two jurisdictions adopted such
initiatives - Santa Monica and West Hollywood. While local policy makers and voters
may want such a policy in place, this does not necessarily mean police officers/chiefs do
not have their own views on marijuana, or other biases, that may cause them to act in
contrast to the views of the public. We therefore examine if, after the adoption of a low

1

http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-medical-pot-20141216-story.html
3
http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana-legalization-and-regulation
2
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priority initiative, there is differential enforcement of police agencies across different
types of marijuana crimes, across areas within their jurisdiction, or across race.
Our research relates to a growing literature that examines various mechanisms
that may affect police behavior. Several papers have looked at how changing the
incentives of police through the War on Drugs affected how police allocated their time,
and the impact of this reallocation of time on other types of crime (Benson and
Rasmussen, 1991; Benson et. al., 1992; Benson, et al., 1994; Benson et al., 1995; Benson
et al., 1998; Sollars et al., 1994). 4 In addition, there are differences in the response of law
enforcement based on the experience of the police officers (DeAngelo and Owens,
2015). 5 There is also a growing literature on how police behavior may respond to
changes in the economic situation of a county, arguing that when a local area is
struggling, police officers issue more traffic tickets in order to generate revenues
(DeAngelo and Hanson, 2014; Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; Makowsky and
Stratmann, 2011).
To conduct our analysis, we use a unique data set on arrests obtained from the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD). This data set gives us the unique opportunity to
study various mechanisms that may be in play regarding how these policies affected
police behavior. First, the LASD office has jurisdiction throughout the county, covering
multiple municipalities. However, only two jurisdictions in LA County enacted low
priority laws, West Hollywood and Santa Monica (but Santa Monica has its own police

4

Ross and Walker (2015) found that police officers in the state of California followed the mandate and
arrested fewer individuals, but that there was no measurable deterrent effect of the initiative on other types
of felony crimes.
5
Leaver (2009) and DeAngelo and McCannon (2015) develop game theoretical models showing the
tradeoff of regulators/police officers between properly applying the law, changing public perceptions, and
societal norms and outcry related to the actions of a regulator. Lum and Nagin (2015) also discuss the role
of citizen reactions to police behavior.

3

force and thus the LASD does not have primary patrol over this area). Therefore, while
the LASD are responsible for patrolling the overwhelming majority of Los Angeles
County, only one municipality within its purview passed a low priority law initiative.
This allows us to see if the policy change caused officers to adjust their behavior in
general throughout the county, or if they only adjusted their behavior in the sole adopting
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, our data includes information on the race of the individual arrested.
This allows us to see another dimension along which police officers could have changed
their behavior by targeting a specific race. Specifically, we examine whether the
relaxation of misdemeanor drug crime laws has a symmetric impact across races, or if a
specific race (or group of races) are disproportionately impacted by these legal changes.
In our analysis we focus specifically on white versus nonwhite individuals.
To determine the effect of low priority initiatives on police behavior, we rely on a
difference-in-differences estimation strategy. We include reporting area fixed effects to
control for unobservable heterogeneity of the locality, year-by-month fixed effects to
control for period specific common shocks across units, as well as reporting area-specific
linear time trends. We first estimate if the adoption of a low priority law affected the
arrest behavior of local police officers. We find that adoption caused a reduction in
arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses, but not felony offenses, consistent with the
findings of Ross and Walker (2015). This result suggests that officers were heeding the
mandate when adjusting their arrest behavior for only the relevant type of minor
marijuana offenses.

4

However, a closer examination of the data reveals that police did not change their
behavior in the manner that would be expected given the policy change. Specifically, we
do not find that police reduced the number of arrests in West Hollywood. In fact, our
data shows evidence that the arrest pattern was flat in West Hollywood over this period.
However, we find that there is a sharp increase in the non-adopting jurisdictions after the
implementation of low priority laws. There are several mechanisms we believe could be
driving this result. First, police may be unhappy with the passage of the low priority
initiative and react by increasing arrests in other areas. Alternatively, it could be that
prior to the adoption of low priority laws, police were treating these offenses as a low
priority, but the passage of the initiative served as a reminder to police that they should
be arresting for these offenses, and hence increased arrests in other areas. 6
Finally, we reexamine if there is a differential enforcement of the policy by police
officers across race of the perpetrator, specifically white versus nonwhite individuals.
We do not find that there was any change in the racial composition of the individuals
arrested as a result of the adoption of a low priority law, suggesting that any racial bias
police may have is not manifesting itself through the enforcement of these initiatives.
Overall, our findings suggest that any bias that may be present is coming from a change
in behavior across jurisdictions, not in a differential enforcement across races or a change
in the enforcement of all types of drug crimes.

6

One mechanism through which this could occur is if localities are running into budgetary problems, and
the passage of this law brings light onto another type of offense that can be used to generate revenues.
Such a result would be consistent with previous work examining the use of traffic citations by local police
agencies to generate revenues during economic downturns (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; Makowsky
and Stratmann, 2011).
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The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section II provides background
information, particularly on low priority initiatives and the nature of the LASD. Section
III describes our data, while Section IV outlines our empirical strategy. Results are
presented in Section V. We conclude and discuss policy implications in Section VI.

II.

Low Priority Laws and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department

Low priority initiatives mandate that minor marijuana possession offenses be the lowest
enforcement priority for local law enforcement agencies. There are a few key
components to low priority laws. First, the law only affects minor marijuana possession
offenses. Felony drug crimes, including felony-level marijuana possession and
distribution offenses, were not affected by the policy change. Second, the law only
affected offenses where marijuana was intended for adult personal use. Possession or
selling of marijuana to minors is not affected by low priority initiatives. Finally, the
mandate was only intended to affect the private use of marijuana, so any offenses
committed on public property were not affected. 7
Within Los Angeles County there are multiple police jurisdictions - local police, city
police, county police, and state police – that oversee the enforcement of laws. Our data
includes only arrests made in Los Angeles County by the LASD, which covers
approximately 79 percent of the geographic area in LA County. In LA County, Santa
Monica and West Hollywood were the only municipalities that adopted low priority
initiatives in our sample period. Santa Monica has its own police agency, therefore any
arrests or crimes reported in this area will not appear in our data set. However, West

7

Most of the initiatives also have some language regarding who was responsible for making sure the
ordinance was enforced by the local police agency.
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Hollywood contracts with LASD for police services and changes in policing behavior in
this area due to the policy change will be present in our data. The city of West Hollywood
has 22 reporting districts out of a total of 943 reporting districts in LA County.
This contractual relationship between the city of West Hollywood and the LASD
for the provision of police services presents challenges to the implementation of the low
priority law in West Hollywood for several reasons. First, for the LASD, complying with
the West Hollywood resolution would mean changing their arrest behavior in one specific
geographic area within their overall jurisdiction. We empirically test whether or not the
LASD changed their behavior at all, if the policy change in West Hollywood caused them
to alter their behavior selectively in the adopting jurisdiction, or if their behavior was
altered uniformly throughout the county.
Second, the West Hollywood City Council has no authority to compel the LASD
to comply with the low priority mandate. The low priority initiative passed by the City
Council is a resolution, which unlike an ordinance, is not a law and is therefore not
legally binding. The city council member who proposed the resolution acknowledged
this, stating that the resolution should “send a message to law enforcement that they
should focus on more serious crimes.” 8
Furthermore, the LA County Sheriff is an elected official who generally
establishes his or her own priorities. 9 County commissioners often control police
department budgeting decisions and therefore may have some indirect influence on the

8

From San Diego Tribune: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2006/jun/20/west-hollywood-toconsider-easing-enforcement-of/
9
Throughout our sample period, the LA County Sheriff was Lee Baca, who was Sheriff from 1998 to 2014.
Therefore, we have no concerns that a change in the Sheriff caused a change in the overall goals and
policies of the LASD. See http://www.badgehistory.com/Sheriffs.html for a list of all LA Sheriffs.
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sheriff’s operations, but even they may lack the authority to determine the priorities of
police. As stated by one city council member, it is unusual for a contracting city to
specify which laws for police to enforce and which to ignore. 10 However, given the fact
that the Sheriff is an elected official, he may choose to follow the resolution if he believes
that such a law reflects the preferences of the electorate and will help him in his
reelection efforts.
Nonetheless, the West Hollywood resolution includes a provision that attempts to
ensure the police are following the decree; it directs the Public Safety Commission of the
City of West Hollywood “to conduct annual reviews of Sheriff Department statistics
related to enforcement activities related to marijuana offenses,” and to present those
findings to the City Council periodically. 11 In addition, if the LASD refuses to heed to
mandate, the city of West Hollywood could discontinue its contract for law enforcement
with the LASD and use another police department, or create their own. This possibility
may also serve to incentivize the LASD to comply with the resolution, especially if their
objective is to maximize their operating budget.
One question that frequently surrounds the implementation of low priority
mandates is whether or not police departments are already deprioritizing low level
marijuana offenses. If police are already considering enforcement of marijuana
misdemeanors as a low priority, then we would see no effect of the law on arresting
behavior of police. This may have been the case in West Hollywood; as a sheriff deputy
who works in West Hollywood stated that officers “use their own judgment in small-time

10
11

From LA Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/20/local/me-pot20
The resolution can be found at: http://www.weho.org/Home/ShowDocument?id=826
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pot cases.” 12 Ross and Walker (2015) found evidence that adopting jurisdictions in
California did have fewer arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses, but the reductions
were small and estimates suggest only approximately 300 additional hours of time were
created through the reduction in arrests.
However, if small marijuana possession offenses were already a low priority, so
low that officers did not consider arresting for this, the passage of the low priority
initiative in West Hollywood may have served as a reminder to police to arrest
individuals for these offenses. An individual found with less than 28.5 grams of
marijuana is subject to a fine only of approximately $100, with fees not to exceed $485. 13
Possession offenses above this amount, that are misdemeanor level offenses, carry a
maximum fine of $500 and six months in jail.14 Thus, it is possible that this policy may
have an unintended effect on arrest behavior in other non-adopting jurisdictions as it
reminded the LASD that these possession offenses could be used to generate revenues
through the fines.
A final challenge to the implementation of the low priority initiative in West
Hollywood is that, like many other low priority initiatives, the West Hollywood
resolution does not specify limits to the amounts of marijuana that should be exempted. It
merely states that “small amounts” should be ignored. This ambiguity may diminish the
effectiveness of the resolution because of the difficulty it creates for police in
implementing the mandate, and it may also allow police to differentially enforce the low

12

From LA Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/20/local/me-pot20
In 2011, California changed its laws so that possession of less than 28.5 grams of cannabis was
considered an infraction, not a misdemeanor. However, during our entire sample period, this was classified
as a misdemeanor and therefore this change should not affect our results.
14
http://www.canorml.org/camjlaws.html
13
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priority resolution, particularly across identifying features of perpetrators (e.g. race). Our
arrest data provided by the LASD separately identifies misdemeanor arrests for marijuana
possession and arrests for felony possession, distribution or intent to sell marijuana. We
will estimate the effect of the low priority mandate separately for these two types of
marijuana arrests with the belief that the policy should only affect misdemeanor crimes.

III.

Data

Our primary data consist of the universe of arrest records from the LASD between 2000
and 2007, which we obtained through a research agreement. 15 Each arrest record
identifies the type of offense, the geographic location of the arrest (reporting district) and
a time stamp for when the arrest took place. Arrests appear in 943 reporting districts in
Los Angeles County, of which 22 reporting districts lie within the city of West
Hollywood. The reporting districts within West Hollywood will be our treated units for
the empirical analysis. The low priority resolution in West Hollywood was passed in June
2006 and was to take effect immediately. Therefore, our treatment time period pertains to
any arrest made beginning July 1, 2006.
We are interested in identifying changes in the likelihood of a marijuana arrest
before and after the low priority mandate took effect. The arrest records differentially
identify misdemeanor marijuana possession from felony marijuana possession. We will
treat these two types of marijuana arrests as different outcomes under the premise that the
low priority mandate should have been enforced on minor possession of marijuana
offenses (i.e. misdemeanor offenses) but not felony possession.

15

The LASD has decided not to release any extracts for more recent years.
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Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis for
the entire 2000-2007 time period. Panel A shows the means and standard deviations of
the variables for the full sample arrest records as well as separately for reporting districts
affected by the low priority mandate and reporting districts not affected by the low
priority mandate. Each observation in the data is an individual arrest record, of which
there are more than 2.5 million. There are 52,672 total arrests in low priority reporting
districts and 2,491,622 arrests in reporting districts not affected by the low priority
mandate. The variable nonwhite is a binary indicator (=1) if the arrested individual was
identified as a race other than white. The race identifier was missing for a large number
of arrests. Of the 725,925 arrest records that identified the race of the individual arrested,
78.9% were nonwhite. 16 However, in West Hollywood where the reporting districts were
subjected to the low priority initiative, less than half of arrests (46.9%) pertained to
nonwhite individuals.
The variable “Low Priority Law” is an indicator (=1) for reporting districts
affected by the mandate. The first column in Panel A shows that 2.1% of all arrests came
from low priority reporting districts. The variables “Misdemeanor Marijuana” and
“Felony Marijuana” are also binary indicators for whether the arrest was for
misdemeanor marijuana possession offense or felony marijuana possession offense,
respectively. Of all arrests in the data, 1.8% were for misdemeanor marijuana possession
and 0.3% were for felony marijuana possession. The fraction of arrests for misdemeanor

16

We will address the missing data for the race identifiers in our empirical analysis.
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marijuana possession was twice as high in reporting districts with no low priority
initiative and the fraction of felony marijuana arrests were three times as high in reporting
districts with no low priority initiative.
One of our objectives is to test whether the LASD implemented the low priority
initiative differentially across racial groups. Panel B shows the fraction of misdemeanor
and felony marijuana arrests separately by white and nonwhite individuals. Across all
reporting districts, the fraction of arrests for misdemeanor marijuana possession is about
5% for both white and nonwhite individuals. The fraction of arrests for felony marijuana
possession is 0.6% and 0.8% for white and nonwhite individuals, respectively.

Unconditional Difference-in-Differences
Table 2 shows the unconditional average marijuana arrest rate in low priority
reporting districts and reporting districts without a low priority mandate, both before and
after the mandate had passed. Panel A shows the difference-in-differences outcomes for
misdemeanor marijuana arrests and Panel B shows the outcomes for felony marijuana
arrests. The top portion of each panel displays the average fraction of arrests, with
standard deviations in parentheses, for each group both before and after the mandate took
effect. Directly below is the average difference for each group pre- and post-treatment
along with standard errors (in brackets) for the t-test that the difference is equal to zero,
assuming unequal variances. The unconditional difference-in-differences estimate is also
presented with standard errors (in brackets) for the test that the difference-in-differences
estimate is equal to zero.

12

In Panel A, the fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests is higher after the
mandate is passed in both low priority and non-low priority reporting districts, but the
increase is only statistically different from zero in reporting districts that were not
subjected to the low priority law. The difference-in-differences estimate is -0.009 and is
statistically significant at the 1% level. While the estimate is small in size, the baseline
fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests for low priority districts from column 2 of
Table 1 is only 0.009. This suggests that the likelihood of arrest for misdemeanor
marijuana possession was significantly reduced after the low priority law took effect.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the rate of felony marijuana arrests increased in all
reporting districts after the mandate was passed, but as with misdemeanor marijuana
possession, the increased arrest rate is only statistically different from zero in non-low
priority reporting districts. Here, the unconditional difference-in-differences estimate is
not statistically different from zero.
Table 2 suggests that there may be underlying differences in trends regarding the
likelihood of arrest for marijuana possession. In order to visually inspect the trends in
marijuana arrest, we aggregated the “Misdemeanor Marijuana” binary variable to
monthly observations pertaining to reporting districts that were subjected to the low
priority initiative and reporting districts that were not. This creates two time series where
each observation reflects the fraction of all arrests that were for misdemeanor marijuana
possession in a particular month. These series are plotted over the sample period in
Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Figure 1 shows the series for reporting districts subject to the low priority
initiative and Figure 2 displays the series for reporting districts that were not subject to

13

the low priority initiative. In both figures, the dashed line identifies the average
misdemeanor marijuana arrest rate, the solid lines are 95% confidence bands, and the
vertical line identifies the month in which the low priority initiative took effect. The
difference in the two series is striking. While there is variation in the arrest rate over time
in both figures, both follow a similar trend before West Hollywood implemented a low
priority initiative but there is a strong upward spike following adoption in non-adopting
districts in Figure 2 and only a small, perhaps insignificant, upward trend in adopting
districts in Figure 1 following the initiative.
These figures visually confirm that there was a significant increase in
misdemeanor marijuana arrests following the law in reporting districts that were not
subjected to the low priority initiative. These trends may foreshadow our main results
from the regression analysis in that the reduction in the likelihood of misdemeanor
marijuana arrest from our regression estimates is not due to fewer arrests in adopting
jurisdictions, but to a slower rate of growth in the arrest rate in comparison to other, nonadopting reporting districts.

IV.

Empirical Specification
Our identification strategy relies on a standard difference-in-differences approach

that accounts for a large amount of unobserved heterogeneity in a panel data setting. To
estimate the effect of the low priority initiative on arrests, our most saturated and
conservative model has the following specification:

𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
14

(1)

where 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is a binary indicator for the type of arrest made (e.g., misdemeanor
marijuana arrest, felony marijuana arrest) for arrest record a in reporting district i and

period t. The data for the outcome variable is comprised of the entire population of arrest
records made by the LASD for all types of crimes. Therefore, the model should be
interpreted as predicting the likelihood of a particular type of arrest relative to all possible
arrests.
Our specification is therefore simply a linear probability model with a binary
dependent variable for the type of arrest that was made. Presumably, it would be
desirable to express the dependent variable as a rate. However, this is not feasible given
the structure of our data. Constructing the dependent variable as an arrest rate as the
number of arrests per population in a reporting district is not possible because population
data by reporting district is not available. It is also not possible to calculate a clearance
rate (arrests/number of reported crimes) because data on reported criminal possession of
marijuana does not exist.
Our specification controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity specific to
each reporting district with reporting district fixed effects, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 . The time period indexed by

t is a year-month combination for which there are 96 months between 2000 and 2007.

Year-month fixed effects, denoted by 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 , capture period-specific shocks that are common
to all reporting districts. Reporting district-specific linear time trends are denoted as 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 .

The standard errors, 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 , are clustered by reporting district. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is an indicator
that identifies whether a reporting district is subject to the low priority initiative and

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is an indicator that identifies the post-treatment period. Our coefficient of
15

interest is 𝜃𝜃, which is the standard difference-in-differences estimator in in this
framework.

We are also interested in whether the low priority law was differentially enforced
across race. We amend Equation (1) by including an indicator 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 for whether the

suspect is recorded as being nonwhite (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1) or white (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0). 17 This
indicator is then interacted with the components of our model that produces the

difference-in-differences estimator. The resulting model takes the following form:

𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
+ Π3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(2)

A nonzero estimate of Π4 would indicate that the low priority law was implemented
differentially for white versus nonwhite suspects.

V.

Results

Impact of Low Priority Laws on Arrest Outcomes
Tables 3 and 4 present our main results for the effect of low priority laws on the
arrest behavior of officers of the LASD. The tables are identically structured but the
dependent variable in Table 3 is an indicator for whether the arrest was for misdemeanor
marijuana possession and the dependent variable in Table 4 is an indicator for whether
the arrest was for felony marijuana possession. The columns of the tables are parameter
estimates from variations of the model specified in Equation (1), where each column
17

We have also estimated models that differentiate Black, White, Hispanic, Asian and Other but find no
differences across these groups. Therefore, we pool all nonwhite individuals for this analysis.
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accounts for different components of the unobserved heterogeneity. Column (1) includes
only reporting district fixed effects, column (2) adds time fixed effects and column (3)
estimates the full model specified with Equation (1) that also has reporting districtspecific linear trends. Each model is estimated with least squares with the standard errors
clustered by reporting district.
While there is no effect of low priority laws on felony marijuana arrests in Table
4, in Table 3, the likelihood of a misdemeanor marijuana arrest is significantly lower in
reporting districts with low priority laws once reporting district fixed effects are included.
Similar to the unconditional estimates in Table 2, the rate of misdemeanor marijuana
arrests is higher after the low priority initiative passed in all reporting districts. Our
coefficient of interest is found in the row labeled LPL*Post. The coefficient is negative
and statistically significant in columns (1)-(3). The coefficient in column (3) is -0.0072,
which is a large reduction in the rate of misdemeanor marijuana arrests relative to the
baseline of 0.0009 for reporting districts with low priority laws found in Table 1.
Figures 1 and 2 hint that any reduction in the likelihood of misdemeanor
marijuana arrest from a difference-in-differences estimate would come from a relatively
higher rate of arrest in reporting districts that were not subjected to the low priority
initiative after it was passed, not through an absolute reduction in misdemeanor
marijuana arrests in reporting districts in West Hollywood. The arrest rate clearly spikes
higher in Figure 2 after the initiative passed in reporting districts not subjected to the
initiative.
This finding relates to a growing literature regarding behavior in general within
the criminal justice system. While policy makers may write laws following their
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preferences and/or the preferences of their constituents, at the end of the day it is up to
those parties within the criminal justice system to either enforce these laws appropriately
or not. For example, while sentencing guidelines may be enacted, it is up to the judges to
follow these policies (see Tonry (2008) for a discussion of the behavior and enforcement
of these policies). Therefore, the spike in arrests in those jurisdictions that did not enact a
low priority law suggests that police are adjusting their behavior by arresting more in
areas without the policy, possibly as a subtle form of protest against a policy they do not
like. Alternatively, the passage of the low priority initiative in West Hollywood may
have reminded police of this offense for which they can arrest individuals, and through
these arrests generate revenue through fines. This argument would suggest that police
may be adjusting their behavior to generate revenue, consistent with research regarding
traffic citations (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; 2011).
The source of identification for our difference-in-differences estimate can easily
be seen by plotting the residuals of the models that account for the unobserved
heterogeneity but do not include variables for the low priority law, the post-adoption
indicator, or the interaction. Figures 3-5 plot the residuals by month for the models
estimated from columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 where LPL, Post, and LPL*Post are excluded.
The dashed line is the average residual and the solid lines are the 95% confidence interval
bands. Residuals pertaining to low priority reporting districts are plotted in blue and
residuals pertaining to the other reporting districts are plotted in black. The vertical line
identifies the month in which the low priority initiative took effect.
Figure 3 shows the residuals when only reporting district fixed effects are
included, Figure 4 shows the residuals after adding time fixed effects, and Figure 5 shows
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the residuals after also including linear trends. Much of the variation in Figures 1 and 2
remains in Figure 3 when only reporting district fixed effects are included in the model.
Including time effects and reporting district-specific linear trends in Figures 4 and 5
wipes out some of the variation, but there is still enough variation to identify a relatively
higher arrest rate in non-adopting jurisdictions. This confirms that the apparent reduction
in misdemeanor marijuana arrest rates due to the low priority law is driven by a large
increase in the arrest rates in other reporting districts after the law took place.

Low Priority Laws and Race
Tables 5 and 6 estimate variations of the specification to include indicators for the race of
the suspect in Equation (2) and have a similar structure to Tables 3 and 4. The columns of
the tables increasingly add additional components to control for possible unobserved
heterogeneity, with column (3) estimating the specification as written in Equation (2).
The dependent variable in Table 5 is an indicator (=1) if the arrest was for a misdemeanor
marijuana possession offense and the dependent variable in Table 6 is an indicator (=1) if
the arrest was for felony marijuana possession. The test for racial differences in the
implementation of the initiative can be seen by inspecting the coefficients in the row for
LPL*Post*Nonwhite.
There appears to be no statistically significant evidence that the LASD
differentially implemented the law for white individuals versus nonwhite individuals. The
coefficient on LPL*Post*Nonwhite is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but
never statistically different from zero. The estimates do suggest, however, that a larger
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fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests in West Hollywood are nonwhite individuals
in all time periods (positive coefficient on LPL*Nonwhite) and that the misdemeanor
marijuana arrest rate declined for nonwhites across all reporting districts after the
initiative passed (negative coefficient on Post*Nonwhite).
As we saw in the summary statistics, the race identifier for arrested suspects is
missing for a large number of observations. Our results in Tables 5 and 6 would be biased
if the race identifier is not missing at random and the LASD systematically did not report
the race of certain suspects during marijuana arrests (i.e. do not report race for black
individuals only). To investigate this issue, we return to our main specification in
Equation (1) and estimate that model on two subsamples of the data – the subsample
where race is missing and again on the subsample where race is non-missing. The
estimates are presented in Table 7.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 estimate Equation (1) on the sample of data where
race is missing and columns (2) and (4) estimate Equation (1) on the sample of data
where race is non-missing. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for misdemeanor
marijuana arrest in columns (1) and (2) and the dependent variable is a binary indicator
for felony marijuana arrest in columns (3) and (4). As in Table 3, the coefficient on
LPL*Post is negative and statistically significant but is substantially more negative on the
sample of data where race is non-missing. This suggests that the implementation of the
low priority law was “more successful” when the LASD recorded the perpetrator’s race.
We interpret these findings as evidence the LASD did not try to hide any racial bias in
differentially implementing the law by not recording the individual’s race.
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Additionally, notice that the coefficient on Post is negative in column (1) of Table
7 (where race is missing) just as it was in the full specification of Table 3 (using the full
sample), but the coefficient on Post is positive in column (2) of Table 7 (where race is
non-missing). This shows that misdemeanor marijuana arrests were more frequent in the
post period after the law took effect when race was actually recorded. Therefore, perhaps
the LASD was more careful in recording race when arresting individuals for
misdemeanor marijuana violations once they were under the scrutiny of the new law.
Lastly, and similar to Table 4, the coefficient on LPL*Post is not statistically different
from zero in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 where the dependent variable is an indicator
for felony marijuana arrest.

VI.

Conclusions

We utilize novel data pertaining to the universe of arrest records from the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department between January 2000 and December 2007 to investigate the
adoption of a low priority initiative by West Hollywood, California in June 2006. The
adoption of the low priority initiative mandated the LA Sheriff’s Department, West
Hollywood’s primary policing agency, to de-emphasize the enforcement of misdemeanor
marijuana possession crimes. The mandate impacted 22 of the 943 reporting districts for
which the LA Sheriff’s Department has jurisdiction and made arrests in our data.
We estimate the impact of the low priority initiative on the likelihood of arrest for
misdemeanor and felony marijuana possession, separately, using a difference-indifferences framework in a panel data setting that absorbs a large amount of unobserved
heterogeneity. While we find no effect of the initiative on felony marijuana arrests, we
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find relatively large declines in the rate in which arrests are made for misdemeanor
marijuana possession in reporting districts that were subjected to the mandate. However,
the negative effects of the low priority initiative on misdemeanor marijuana possession
are not due to an absolute drop in the arrest rate in West Hollywood, but instead reflect a
large increase in the arrests rate for misdemeanor possession in reporting districts not
affected by the initiative. That is, the rate at which the LA Sheriff’s Department arrested
individuals for marijuana possession outside of West Hollywood increased dramatically
after the initiative was passed but officers did not increase (or decrease) the arrest rate of
individuals as much in reporting districts within West Hollywood. In one regard the
initiative has failed, as the arrest rate for marijuana possession increased in areas other
than West Hollywood after the law passed but it succeeded in the sense that the LA
Sheriff’s Department did not enforce the laws with the same increased intensity within
West Hollywood.
For a large fraction of the arrest records, we also have a race identifier that allows
us to test whether or not the initiative was differentially implemented. While we find no
statistically significant evidence that the low priority law was differentially implemented
the law across race, we do find that a larger fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests in
West Hollywood are nonwhite and that the misdemeanor marijuana arrest rate declined
for nonwhites across all reporting districts after the initiative passed. We provide some
evidence that these findings are not driven by the LA Sheriff’s Department trying to hide
any racial bias in differentially implementing the law by not recording the individual’s
race.
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Our results have several important implications for the study of police behavior
and the adoption of policy related to law enforcement. First, our finding that the adoption
of a low priority initiative in West Hollywood caused police to increase arrests in other
areas raises several important questions and implications regarding police behavior. One
explanation for this increase is that the LASD did not agree with the initiative passed by
West Hollywood, and reacted by arresting more individuals in other jurisdictions.
Alternatively, it could be that these laws were already the lowest priority of the LASD, so
much so that they were not even thinking to arrest for minor marijuana offenses.
Therefore, the adoption of the low priority mandate by West Hollywood reminded police
officers to arrest for this activity, and they did so in other jurisdictions. This may be
especially true if once the initiative was passed, the LASD viewed arresting individuals
for more minor marijuana offenses as another source of revenue when the recession
began.
In addition, our findings have important implications for the enforcement of
“soft” laws or informal agreements (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Gill and Marion, 2013).
While the West Hollywood City Council may have voted to make these minor marijuana
possession offenses the lowest priority, the LASD does not report to the West Hollywood
City Council. Therefore, the initiative can be seen almost as an indicator of preferences
of the local jurisdiction, with no formal mechanism through which the City Council can
hold the LASD accountable. Despite this, the LASD followed the instructions of the
West Hollywood City Council and did not increase arrests for minor marijuana
possession offenses in West Hollywood like they did in other jurisdictions.
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Figure 3
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Figure 5
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A

Nonwhite
Low Priority Law
Misdemeanor Marijuana
Felony Marijuana
Observations

Full Sample
0.789
(0.408)
0.021
(0.142)
0.018
(0.133)
0.003
(0.052)
2544305

Low Priority Law = 1 Low Priority Law = 0
0.469
0.797
(0.499)
(0.402)
--0.009
(0.096)
0.001
(0.038)
52672

0.018
(0.133)
0.003
(0.052)
2491633

Nonwhite = 1
0.050
(0.218)
0.008
(0.088)
572991

Nonwhite = 0
0.051
(0.220)
0.006
(0.077)
152934

Panel B

Misdemeanor Marijuana
Felony Marijuana
Observations

Note: Entries are the sample mean with standard deviation in parentheses. There are 725925 non-missing
entries for the race identifier.
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Table 2: Unconditional Differences in Marijuana Arrests
Panel A
LPL = 0

Misdemeanor
Marijuana

LPL = 1

Full
Sample

Pretreatment

PostTreatment

Pretreatment

PostTreatment

0.0180
(0.1328)

0.016
(0.126)

0.026
(0.160)

0.009
(0.095)

0.011
(0.103)

Difference = 0.010***
[0.0002]

Difference = 0.002
[0.0011]

Difference-in-Difference = -0.009***
[0.002]
Panel B
LPL = 0

Felony
Marijuana

LPL = 1

Full
Sample

Pretreatment

PostTreatment

Pretreatment

PostTreatment

0.0027
(0.0516)

0.0025
(0.050)

0.0033
(0.058)

0.001
(0.037)

0.002
(0.042)

Difference = 0.0009***
[0.00009]

Difference = 0.0004
[0.0004]

Difference-in-Difference = -0.0005
[0.0006]
Note: LPL stands for Low Priority Law. Entries in the table reflect the proportion of misdemeanor and
felony marijuana arrests for all arrests made by the Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department for the
full sample period 2000-2007. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets for
the t-tests for the difference in means equal to zero and assuming unequal variances. For the full sample
N=2,544,305. ***indicates p-value < 0.01.
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Table 3: The Effect of Low Priority Law on Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests
(1)
(2)
(3)
Low Priority Law
-0.0028
-0.0035*
-0.0036*
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
(0.0020)
Post
0.0103***
0.0180***
-0.0033*
(0.0007)
(0.0021)
(0.0020)
LPL*Post
-0.0093***
-0.0091***
-0.0072***
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
(0.0018)
Constant
0.0160***
0.0194***
0.0192***
(0.0001)
(0.0012)
(0.0011)
Reporting District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Period FE
No
Yes
Yes
RD-specific linear
No
No
Yes
time trends
R2
Observations

0.011
2544305

0.011
2544305

0.013
2544305

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest. Models are
estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in
parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took
effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: The Effect of Low Priority Laws on Felony Marijuana Arrests
(1)
(2)
(3)
Low Priority Law
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
Post
0.0009***
0.0018***
0.0006
(0.0001)
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
LPL*Post
-0.0006
-0.0006
-0.0008
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
Constant
0.0025***
0.0022***
0.0021***
(0.0000)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
Reporting District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Period FE
No
Yes
Yes
RD-specific linear
No
No
Yes
time trends
R2
Observations

0.004
2544305

0.004
2544305

0.004
2544305

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest. Models are estimated by
least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. LPL=1
if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took effect. FE stands for
fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: The Effect of Low Priority Law on Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests by Race
(1)
(2)
(3)
Low Priority Law
-0.0138**
-0.0131**
-0.0154***
(0.0055)
(0.0055)
(0.0052)
Post
0.0340***
0.0907***
0.0946***
(0.0027)
(0.0061)
(0.0064)
LPL*Post
-0.0302***
-0.0297***
-0.0116**
(0.0063)
(0.0064)
(0.0049)
Nonwhite
0.0006
0.0001
-0.0001
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
LPL*Nonwhite
0.0107**
0.0108**
0.0113**
(0.0046)
(0.0046)
(0.0045)
Post*Nonwhite
-0.0082***
-0.0081***
-0.0061***
(0.0025)
(0.0025)
(0.0023)
LPL*Post*Nonwhite
0.0012
0.0013
-0.0013
(0.0074)
(0.0074)
(0.0072)
Constant
0.0435***
0.0139***
0.0129***
(0.0012)
(0.0032)
(0.0029)
Reporting District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Period FE
No
Yes
Yes
RD-specific linear time
No
No
Yes
trends
R2
Observations

0.019
725925

0.022
725925

0.026
725925

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest. Models are
estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in
parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took
effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: The Effect of Low Priority Laws on Felony Marijuana Arrests by Race
(1)
(2)
(3)
Low Priority Law
0.0004
0.0007
0.0006
(0.0019)
(0.0019)
(0.0019)
Post
0.0028***
0.0079***
0.0055***
(0.0006)
(0.0015)
(0.0019)
LPL*Post
-0.0014
-0.0013
-0.0008
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
(0.0026)
Nonwhite
0.0000
-0.0000
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
LPL*NW
0.0008
0.0009
0.0008
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
Post*NW
-0.0005
-0.0005
-0.0007
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
LPL*Post*NW
-0.0028
-0.0029
-0.0026
(0.0032)
(0.0032)
(0.0032)
Constant
0.0069***
0.0026***
0.0024***
(0.0003)
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
Reporting District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Period FE
No
Yes
Yes
RD-specific linear
No
No
Yes
time trends
R2
Observations

0.006
725925

0.006
725925

0.007
725925

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest. Models are estimated by
least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. LPL=1
if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took effect. NW stands for
Nonwhite, FE for fixed effects and RD for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: The Effect of Low Priority Laws: Race Identifier Missing vs Non-missing
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrest
Felony Marijuana Arrest
Race Missing Race Non-missing Race Missing Race Non-missing
Low Priority Law
-0.0011
-0.0101**
-0.0002
0.0010
(0.0009)
(0.0045)
(0.0002)
(0.0017)
Post
-0.0400***
0.0900***
-0.0010**
0.0047**
(0.0014)
(0.0058)
(0.0004)
(0.0019)
LPL*Post
-0.0057***
-0.0100***
-0.0004
-0.0019
(0.0013)
(0.0038)
(0.0003)
(0.0014)
Constant
0.0191***
0.0129***
0.0020***
0.0024***
(0.0012)
(0.0029)
(0.0004)
(0.0007)
Reporting District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Period FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
RD-specific linear
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
time trends
R2
Observations

0.015
1818380

0.026
725925

0.005
1818380

0.007
725925

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest in columns (1) and
(2). The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest in columns (3) and (4).
Columns (1) and (3) estimate the models on the sample of data where the race identifier is missing.
Columns (2) and (4) estimate the models on the sample of data where the race identifier is non-missing.
Models are estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law
took effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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